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COMMENTS 
Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment: 
A Human Cannonball's Rather Rough Landing 
It should be obvious at once that these four types of inva- 
sion may be subject, in some respects a t  least, to different rules; 
and that when what is said as to any one of them is carried over 
to another, it may not be at  all applicable, and confusion may 
follow .' 
When Dean Prosser first delineated his by-now-famous four 
categories of invasion of p r i~acy ,~  he was careful to add the above 
caveat. A plaintiff complaining of appropriation of his name or 
likeness might well be asserting completely different interests 
than a plaintiff seeking redress for public disclosure of private 
facts. Distinct differences also exist between the other categories, 
intrusion upon physical solitude or seclusion and publicity plac- 
ing the plaintiff in a false light. If these varying interests and 
differences are not recognized, confusion could well follow. 
And Hugo Zacchini, for one, has no doubt that confusion 
indeed did follow. 
Mr. Zacchini occupies a rather special niche in the entertain- 
ment field, that of a human cannonball. He allows himself to' be 
hurtled from the mouth of a cannon into a net some 200 feet away 
to the awe of onlookers a t  county fairs and other places of amuse- 
ment.3 On August 30, 1972, Zacchini was performing his feat a t  
the Geauga County Fair in Burton, Ohio. Also present that day 
was a reporter for the Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Company, 
operator of television station WEWS in Cleveland. The reporter 
was carrying a small movie camera. Zacchini noticed the reporter 
1. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (emphasis added). 
2. Prosser delineated these categories as: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion or solitude, or into his private 
affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or 
likeness. 
Id. 
3. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 2849, 2851 (1977). 
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and requested that his act not be filmed.' The reporter responded 
that Zacchini had no right to restrict filming of a newsworthy 
event.Wver Zacchini's express objection, the act was filmed the 
following day and presented as a 15-second segment of the sta- 
tion's 11 o'clock news program. Zacchini then filed a lawsuit, 
charging that use of the film clip constituted an "unlawful appro- 
priation of his professional property."The trial court granted the 
defendant's motion for summary judgment,' and Zacchini un- 
dauntedly petitioned the Ohio Eighth District Court of AppeaW 
It was at that point that the labels attached to the case were 
first tossed into the air9-terms such as "privacy," "right of pub- 
licity," and, ominously, "Time, Inc. u. Hill."lo And not until the 
United States Supreme Court handed down Zacchini u. Scripps- 
Howard Broadcasting Co. l1 on June 28, 1977 was anyone quite 
sure just which labels stuck where. 
This Comment will detail briefly the origins of what is 
lumped together in the law of torts as the "right of privacy." 
Next, the emergence of the "right of publicity," an offshoot of one 
of Presser's four branches of privacy-appropriation of the plain- 
tiff's name or likeness-will be given special attention. This right, 
protecting a celebrity's proprietary interest in his personality, has 
been recognized by a growing number of jurisdictions.12 As this 
Comment will show, however, jurisdictions adopting the new tort 
unfortunately have not always succeeded in clearly separating it 
as a distinct branch of the privacy rubric. For example, the first 
amendment privilege attached by the Supreme Court in Time, 
Inc. v. HiW3 to "false light" privacy cases,*' has been applied 
4. Id. 
5. Brief for Petitioner at 4, Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. 
2849 (1977). 
6. Id. at 3. 
7. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 97 S. Ct. at 2851. 
8. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App., 
July 10, 1975), reu'd, 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2851 
(1977). 
9. As the trial court did not issue an opinion, its treatment of the privacy, right of 
publicity, and first amendment issues in the case is unknown. Brief for Petitioner at 4. 
10. 385 U.S. 374 (1967); see notes 75-84 and accompanying text infra. 
11. 97 S. Ct. 2851 (1977). 
12. Note, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and Celebrities, 42 
BROOKLYN L. REV. 527 (1976). 
13. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
14. Hill held that publication of a matter of "public interest" was privileged by the 
first amendment "in the absence of proof that the defendant published the report with 
knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth." Id. at 387-88. 
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indiscriminately by many courts to appropriation privacy cases.15 
Clarification of this confusion, which when unresolved often led 
to absurd results,16 is the focus of this discussion. 
This Comment follows the somewhat tortuous path travelled 
by the courts in Zucchini. The case began as a seemingly simple 
appropriation privacy case, underwent without major difficulty a 
transformation into a right of publicity case," and then ran head- 
on into false light privacy's first amendment privilege-hardly a 
case history of orderliness. In light of this confusion, it is ironic 
to note that in 1974 two legal scholars wrote, "If there is certainty 
in any area of privacy law, it is in the area of appropriation."18 
A. Origins of the Right of Privacy 
The state of privacy law has been described as that of a 
"haystack in a hurricane."lVhatever its present state, however, 
it is generally agreed that the right of privacy had its genesis with 
perhaps the most influential of all law review articles,z0 The Right 
to Privacy,z1 written by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 
1890. The topic has since been the subject of innumerable law 
review articlesz2 and a burgeoning number of cases.z3 
The common law in its "eternal was called upon by 
- 
15. See notes 75-101 and accompanying text infra. 
16. See notes 94-101 and accompanying text infra. 
17. Several courts have noticed inherent differences between privacy theory and the 
interests protected by the right of publicity. Some propose that the right of publicity be 
recognized as an independent tort: 
Although misappropriation of one's name, likeness or personality for commer- 
cial use has been considered as one species of the general tort of invasion of 
privacy, many authorities suggest that misappropriation is a distinctly indepen- 
dent tort. The reasoning behind this approach is that Presser's first three catego- 
ries involve the incidence of specific personal harm (i.e., injury to feelings), 
while the fourth is generally considered to involve a pecuniary loss, an interfer- 
ence with property. 
Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-80 (D. Minn. 1970) (footnote omitted); 
see also Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Grant 
v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876, 879-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., 
114 U.S.P.Q. 314, 315-16 (Pa. C.P. 1957). 
18. Pember & Teeter, Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. 
REV. 57, 87 (1974). 
19. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir. 1956). 
20. Prosser, supra note 1, a t  383. 
21. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hmv. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
22. Prosser, supra note 1, a t  384 & n.6. 
23. Id. at 386-89. 
24. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, a t  193. 
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Warren and Brandeis to secure to the individual the right to be 
"let alone."25 They stated that while there were superficial re- 
semblances between common law actions for libel and slander 
and their espoused "right of privacy," defamation protected 
"material" interests, while the rights protected by the law of 
privacy were "~piritual."~~ This "material-spiritual" dichotomy 
led one critic to charge that the right of privacy may be merely a 
petty offspring of prissy Victorian morality.27 
Whatever the foundation of the right, it was rejected in 1902 
by the first court to consider a distinct privacy action. In 
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box C O . , ~ ~  the New York Court of 
Appeals was confronted with a complaint that use of the plain- 
tiffs picture on the defendant's box of flour without her consent 
invaded her right to privacy. The court, noting that recognition 
of any such right was the job of the legislature, denied recovery.2g 
The New York legislature reacted one year later by enacting sec- 
tions 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, dealing specifi- 
cally with the right of privacy.30 This statute, fundamental to 
many cases considered later in this comment,31 provided relief for 
appropriation of a person's name or likeness for advertising or 
purposes of trade. 
Warren and Brandeis' new tort was received more warmly in 
Georgia. On facts quite similar to those in the Roberson case, that 
state's supreme court held in 1905 that, within constitutional 
limits of free speech and press, one has the right to be free from 
unwanted publicity and that use of one's picture in an advertis- 
ment without consent violates the right .32 Thus, Pavesich v. New 
25. Id. at  195. 
26. Id. at  197. 
27. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & 
CONTEMP. ROB. 326, 329 (1966). 
28. 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). 
29. Id. at  545, 64 N.E. at 443. 
30. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW $9 50-51 (McKinney 1976). Following New York's lead, four 
other jurisdictions have passed similar statutes. Of the five appropriation statutes, four 
are essentially identical and make appropriation of the name, picture, or portrait of 
another "for the purpose of advertising" or "for trade purposes" a misdemeanor and the 
basis of a right of action for damages. Id.; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§  839.1-.2 (West 
Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. $ 4  76-9-405 to 406 (1953); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1950). The 
major distinction between the four statutes is that under the New York law the right of 
action is restricted to "any living person" whose name, picture, or portrait is appropriated 
for commercial use. In the Oklahoma, Utah, and Virginia statutes, the right of action 
survives the person whose name or likeness is appropriated. The major distinction of the 
California appropriation statute, CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1977), is that it 
contains no penal provision. 
31. See notes 85-107 and accompanying text infra. 
32. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190,220,50 S.E. 68,80-81(1905). 
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England Life Insurance Co. became the leading case in the area 
of privacy .33 
It is apparent that the early privacy cases and statutes were 
mixing two arguably discrete ideas: Warren and Brandeis' classi- 
cal right to be "let alone," and unauthorized appropriation of 
personality to secure a profit for the appropr ia t~r .~~  Failure to 
recognize fundamental differences inherent in these two ideas 
contributed to confusion complicating later cases35 and ulti- 
mately Zacchini. 
An important exception engrafted upon the right of privacy 
by Warren and Brandeis and thereafter accepted by the courts36 
was that "[tlhe right to privacy does not prohibit any publica- 
tion of matter which is of public or general intere~t."~' Warren 
and Brandeis observed that: 
[tlhe general object in view is to protect the privacy of 
private life, and to whatever degree and in whatever connection 
a man's life has ceased to be private, before the publication 
under consideration has been made, to that extent the protec- 
tion is to be w i t h d r a ~ n . ~ ~  
Development of the law of privacy was rapid.3g By the time 
Dean Prosser wrote his article entitled Privacy40 in 1960, he as- 
serted there were well over 300 privacy cases on the books.41 These 
cases, moreover, could be classified into four distinct categories 
"which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise 
have almost nothing in common."42 These four categories, as 
mentioned earlier, include: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiffs 
physical solitude or seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private 
facts, (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the 
public eye, and (4) appropriation of the plaintiffs name or like- 
ness for the defendant's benefit or advantage. Prosser, in spite of 
33. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. 
U.L. REV. 553, 558-59 (1960). 
34. Kalven, supra note 27, at 331. 
35. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 
U.S. 823 (1941); Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier v. 
Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). 
36. See, e.g., Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 
Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940). 
37. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 214. 
38. Id. at 215 (footnote omitted). 
39. For a list of states and cases recognizing the right of privacy, see Prosser, supra 
note 1, at 386-88. 
40. Prosser, supra note 1. 
41. Id. at 388. 
42. Id. at 389. 
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a careful warning that principles applicable to one branch of the 
tort may not apply to another and directly after the statement 
above that they have almost nothing in common, perhaps unfor- 
tunately added, "except that each represents an interference with 
the right of the plaintiff . . . 'to be let alone'."43 
B. Right of Publicity: Protecting the Nonprivate Person 
As courts were soon to discover, many privacy cases involving 
appropriation of the plaintiffs name or likeness did not involve 
the right to be "let alone," but rather the right to be paid for 
being "bothered." 
One of the first celebrities to invoke privacy theory to redress 
unprivileged use of his name and likeness was Thomas Edison. 
In Edison u. Edison Polyform Manufacturing Co. ,44 plaintiff Edi- 
son sought an injunction against the use of his name and likeness 
on bottles of the defendant's medicinal preparation. The court, 
holding for Edison, vindicated his proprietary interest in his 
name and likeness: 
If a man's name be his own property, as no less an authority 
than the United States Supreme Court says it is . . . it is diffi- 
cult to understand why the peculiar cast of one's features is not 
also one's property, and why its pecuniary value, if it has one, 
does not belong to its owner, rather than to the person seeking 
to make an unauthorized use of it.45 
Apparently without much difficulty, the court classified appro- 
priation of this property interest as an invasion of privacy.46 But 
the shoals of privacy theory, hidden in the semantic baggage of 
the word privacy, soon became apparent when the theory was 
invoked by other celebrities. 
In O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co. ,47 the plaintiff was a well- 
known collegiate football star whose photograph had been taken 
and circulated by the university's publicity department. Defen- 
dant Pabst used the photo on a calender advertising its beer.48 
The plaintiff had turned down a similar offer from another beer 
company that had offered $400 for use of his p h ~ t o . ~ T h e  court 
43. Id. 
44. 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (Ch. 1907). 
45. Id. at 141, 67 A. at 394. 
46. Id. 
47. 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1941). 
48. Id. at 168. 
49. Id. at 170 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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refused relief, holding that by becoming a famous personality the 
plaintiff had in a sense "waived" his right to privacy: 
Assuming then, what is by no means clear, that an action 
for right of privacy would lie in Texas at the suit of a private 
person, we think it clear that the action fails; because plaintiff 
is not such a person and the publicity he got was only that which 
he had been constantly seeking and receiving; . . . and there 
were no statements or representations made in connection with 
it, which were or could be either false, erroneous or damaging 
to plaintiff.50 
In contrast to the Edison court, the O'Brien court, blinded 
by the word "privacy," had failed to see that what the plaintiff 
was seeking to redress was appropriation of a proprietary interest. 
Judge Edwin R. Holmes in his dissent, however, saw through the 
privacy label to what was actually at issue. The right to receive 
a royalty, not be left alone, was what plaintiff sought: 
The right of privacy is distinct from the right to use one's 
name or picture for purposes of commercial advertisement. The 
latter is a property right that belongs to every one; it may have 
much or little, or only a nominal value; but it is a personal right, 
which may not be violated with impunity.51 
In addition to imputed waiver of privacy, other problems 
confronted the public figure who sought redress under privacy 
theory for appropriation of his personality. As a personal right, 
privacy was deemed to be n~nassignable.~~ As such, a person did 
not sell a license to use his name or picture, but merely made a 
promise not to bring suit for invasion of privacys3-a suit which, 
if the person was a public figure, would in many jurisdictions 
probably be ineffective anyway. In addition to being nonassigna- 
ble, the right was not descendible-it expired with the celebrity, 
and a surviving spouse could not redress even blatant appropria- 
tion of per~onali ty.~~ As long as appropriation was fixedly catego- 
50. Id. (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
51. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
52. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. ROB. 203, 209 (1954). 
53. See, e.g., Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 F.2d 763 (5th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935). 
54. Miller v. Universal Pictures Co., 201 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1960), aff'd, 10 
N.Y.2d 9'72, 180 N.E.2d 248,224 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1961); see also Price v. Hal Roach Studios, 
Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). In Price, the court observed: 
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the statu- 
tory right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclu- 
sion to any such claim. In addition, based upon the same theoretical foundation, 
such a right of privacy is not assignable during life. 
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rized as usurpation of a privacy instead of a propriety interest, 
courts would often turn their heads, for one reason or another, 
when celebrities sought relief. The animal trainer, who performed 
during halftime of a football game and discovered that his act had 
been broadcast without his consent and contrary to his contract, 
was dismissed with the observation that as he was already per- 
forming before a large crowd, he had no privacy to assert.55 
The situation was not to go unremedied. In 1953, the Second 
Circuit first coined the phrase "right of publicity" to deal with 
appropriation of a celebrity's personality. The case, Haelan Labo- 
ratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. ,56 involved the right to 
use a ballplayer's photograph on chewing gum cards. The plain- 
tiff had made a contract with an athlete for the exclusive right 
to his picture for a stated time. The defendant, a rival chewing 
gum company, deliberately induced the player to authorize its 
use of his picture. The defendant, arguing classical privacy 
theory, asserted that the athlete's contract with the plaintiff was 
no more than a release, without which the plaintiff would be 
liable under the New York privacy statute for use of the photo- 
graph." The court rejected this reasoning: 
We think that, in  addition to and independent of that right of 
privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a 
right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to 
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture . . . . 
Whether it be labelled a "property" right is immaterial; for 
here, as often elsewhere, the tag "property" simply symbolizes 
the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. 
This right might be called a "right of publicity." For it is 
common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially 
actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised 
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely 
deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing adver- 
tisements . . . . This right of publicity would usually yield 
them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclu- 
sive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their 
Id. at 844 (footnote omitted). The court, however, rejected such reasoning, holding that 
as the right of publicity was a "property right," it was freely assignable and descendible. 
Id. 
55. Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). 
56. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). 
57. Id. at 868. 
58. Id. (emphasis added). But see Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bradsby Co., 78 
F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 645 (1935) (personality's interest in his 
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Thus, because appropriation of a celebrity's personality in- 
volved considerations distinct from appropriation of a private 
person's personality, the appropriation branch of privacy law had 
sprouted its own limb. While appropriation of a private person's 
picture may involve, as Prosser noted when he first devised the 
category, intrusion on that plaintiffs right to be "let alone,"59 
appropriation of the celebrity's personality involved a pecuniary 
loss to the celebrity-an interference with a proprietary interest .60 
The quite-different considerations involved in appropriation of a 
private person's personality and appropriation of a celebrity's 
personality raise the question of whether it might not be better 
to completely sever this new limb from appropriation privacy 
theory altogether. 
In view of the argument made by the court in Haelan, it may 
even be questionable whether Warren and Brandeis would place 
the appropriation of a celebrity's personality under the privacy 
rubric. In their article, they made a rather detailed analysis of the 
common law protection given literary property, often noted as 
common law copyright." From this analysis they extrapolated a 
common law protection, i. e. ,  privacy, for forms of expression that 
formerly could not be readily placed under the common law liter- 
ary property rules. In the course of this discussion they noted 
where the recognized common law rules do not extend and where 
the right of privacy begins: 
What is the nature, the basis, of this right to prevent the 
publication of manuscripts or works of art? It is stated to be the 
enforcement of a right of property; and no difficulty arises in 
accepting this view, so long as we have only to deal with the 
reproduction of literary and artistic compositions. They cer- 
tainly possess many of the attributes of ordinary property: they 
are transferable; they have a value; and publication or reprod- 
uction is a use by which that value is realized. But where the 
value of the production is found not in the right to take the 
profits arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the 
relief afforded by the ability to prevent any publication at all, 
it is difficult to regard the right as one of property, in the com- 
mon acceptation of that term!* 
-- 
name and likeness not vendible in gross, as it is not "property"). Hanna, however, has 
been generally ignored. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 I?. Supp. 1277,1282 (D. Minn. 1970). 
59. Prosser, supra note 1, at 389. 
60. See note 17 supra. 
61. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 200-01. 
62. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
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True, the right of publicity does not entail, in most cases, reprod- 
uction of "literary and artistic compositions," but it certainly 
encompasses the other criteria set forth by Warren and Brandeis 
as descriptive of a property interest. The right of publicity, where 
recognized, is transferable. The common experience of celebrities 
selling their endorsements to the highest bidder shows, aside from 
transferability, that the right has a value. Publication, or con- 
trolled exposure by the celebrity, is how he makes a profit from 
the right. Its value is certainly neither in the celebrity's "peace 
of mind" nor in his ability to prevent any publication a t  all about 
himself. While the considerations involved in appropriation of a 
truly "private" person's name or likeness may fall on the privacy 
side of this analysis, Warren and Brandeis probably would not 
include a celebrity's right of publicity under the right of privacy. 
Continued use of the "privacy" label by courts dealing with the 
right of publicity issue may be unfounded as well as unwise. 
Some courts, noting the basic differences between the con- 
cepts of privacy and right of publicity, may be about to remove 
the right of publicity from the general privacy rubrkfi3 In 
Uhlaender v. Henricksen," the plaintiff sued on behalf of all 
major league baseball players to enjoin the use of their names in 
the defendant's table baseball game. The defendant sought to 
treat the matter as a privacy action, but the court quickly clari- 
fied what could have become muddy waters: 
Although misappropriation of one's name, likeness or per- 
sonality for commercial use has been considered as one species 
of the general tort of invasion of privacy, many authorities sug- 
gest that misappropriation is a distinctly independent tort. The 
reasoning behind this approach is that Prosser's first three cate- 
gories involve the incidence of specific personal harm (i.e., in- 
jury to feelings), while the fourth [appropriation] is generally 
considered to involve a pecuniary loss, an interference with 
property .65 
In a more recent federal case from the Southern District of 
New York, the widows of Stan Laurel and Oliver Hardy brought 
an action for appropriation of the right of publicity against the 
63. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1955); 
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); Grant 
v. Esquire, Inc., 367 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. 
Super. 327, 235 A.2d 62 (1967); Hogan v. A.S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314 (Pa. 
C.P. 1957). 
64. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970). 
65. Id. at 1279-80 (footnote omitted). 
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holders of copyrights to certain of the comedians' films? The 
court held for the plaintiffs and firmly distinguished the right of 
publicity from the right of privacy: 
While much confusion is generated by the notion that the 
right of publicity emanates from the classic right of privacy, the 
two rights are clearly separable. The protection from intrusion 
upon an individual's privacy, on the one hand, and protection 
from appropriation of some element of an individual's personal- 
ity for commercial exploitation, on the other hand, are different 
in theory and scope.67 
The court extended the right of publicity to its logical end, hold- 
ing that since it could be termed a property right, it survived the 
death of the comedians and descended to their wives? A Califor- 
nia court has reached a similar conclusion concerning Bella Lu- 
gosi's right of pub l i~ i ty .~~  
C. Privacy, Appropriation, and the First Amendment: 
Confusing the Disparate Branches 
While the right of publicity is clearly separable from the right 
of privacy, most courts have refused to make a clean break with 
the privacy rubric. The right of publicity, therefore, hovers some- 
where as a subdivision of the appropriation privacy tort, which 
in turn is a subdivision of general privacy theory. Aside from 
semantic difficulties involved in classifying a celebrity's proprie- 
tary interest in his personality as a privacy interest, courts have 
had some problems keeping the various branches of privacy 
theory distinct from each other. A pronounced difficulty in this 
area was encountered when courts began balancing the first 
amendment against the diverse privacy torts. 
As has been noted, Warren and Brandeis did not believe the 
right of privacy protected matters of public interest.'O The Su- 
preme Court, consistent with this reasoning, held that in false 
light privacy cases matters of public interest are privileged unless 
published with knowing falsity or reckless disregard for the 
truth.71 But the fact that the privilege attached to the "discrete 
context"72 of false light cases was often forgotten, and courts ap- 
66. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
67. Id. at 843 (footnote omitted). 
68. Id. at 844. 
69. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. 541, 551 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1972). 
70. Notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. 
71. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967). 
72. Id. at 390-91. 
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plied the privilege to privacy cases generall~.'~ And courts, com- 
mitted to "privacy-includes-appropriation" reasoning, have not 
always resisted the temptation to transfer the first amendment 
privilege for false light cases over to appropriation cases since, 
after all, they both involve "privacy." Similar reasoning led the 
Ohio Supreme Court into error when balancing first amendment 
concerns against the right of publicity in Z~cchini.'~ 
The verbal thicket in this area of privacy law is dense, and 
the confusion palpable. An examination, therefore, of one juris- 
diction's confusion of the false light first amendment privilege 
with the appropriation tort and the subsequent resolution of that 
confusion will shed light on what happened in Zucchini. New 
York has been chosen for this dubious honor, for no particular 
reason other than that the evolution and ultimate resolution of 
the confusion is clearly demonstrated by cases from that jurisdic- 
tion. 
At this point it becomes necessary to consider the oft cited, 
sometimes maligned75 case of Time, Inc. u. Hill.76 One of the 
major Supreme Court pronouncements on privacy, the case 
began in the New York courts as what Prosser would classify as 
a "false light" tort. The Hill family had undergone the harrowing 
experience of being held captive in the Hill home by escaped 
convicts. The family's experience was dramatized in a book and 
later produced as a Broadway play. Life magazine took actors 
from the play to the home where the incident occurred to reenact 
scenes from the play. These scenes were published as if depicting 
the actual experiences of the family, while in reality there was 
substantial fictionalization. The Hill family brought an action 
under the New York statute for invasion of privacy. Recognizing 
that the first amendment commanded some protection of the 
speech involved, the New York Court of Appeals allowed the Hills 
to recover only upon a showing of material and substantial falsifi- 
cation." The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude 
the application of the New York statute to redress false reports 
of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the 
73. Notes 85-101 and accompanying text infra. 
74. Notes 130-41 and accompanying text infra. 
75. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Riuacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935 (1968). 
76. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). 
77. Id. at 386-87. 
5791 RIGHT OF PRIVACY 591 
defendant published the report with knowledge of its falsity or 
in reckless disregard of the 
The language, "knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of 
the truth," was borrowed directly from the famous libel case of 
New York Times Co. v.  S ~ l l i v a n . ~ ~  That case, involving the al- 
leged libel of a public official, held that a state under the first and 
fourteenth amendments could not award damages to a public 
official for "defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves 'actual malice'-that the statement was made 
with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was true or false."80 The New York Times case was the begin- 
ning of a string of Supreme Court cases dealing with first amend- 
ment impact on defamationY The court in Hill expressly stated 
that its use of the falsity standard from New York Times was not 
a "blind applicati~n,"~~ but a studied one made after considera- 
tion of the factors arising in the particular context of privacy 
actions: "Therefore, although the First Amendment principles 
pronounced in New York Times guide our conclusion, we reach 
that conclusion only by applying these principles in this discrete 
context."" Thus, for false light privacy cases involving matters of 
public interest, Hill commands substantial first amendment pro- 
t e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  Application of Hill to other cases has, however, some- 
78. Id. at  387-88. 
79. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
80. Id. at  254. 
81. Some of the more prominent of these defamation cases, cited by the Supreme 
Court in Zucchini, 97 S. Ct. a t  2856, include: Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 
29 (1971) (New York Times actual malice test extended to matters of "public interest"); 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) ("public interest" test for application of 
the actual malice standard reviewed; defamed private individuals may recover on a lesser 
showing than knowing or reckless falsity); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) 
(Gertz substantially reaffirmed). 
82. 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967). 
83. Id. at  390-91. 
84. However, the present status of the Hill test even in false light privacy cases is 
questionable due to the recent contraction in application of the New York Times actual 
malice standard in defamation cases involving private individuals. See Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court has questioned the broad applicability of the 
standard in false light privacy cases involving private individuals. In Cantrell v. Forest 
City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974), the Court reviewed a false light privacy case 
involving a newspaper follow-up story on the family of a bridge collapse victim. Because 
the jury had been adequately instructed on the Hill falsity standard, the Court wrote: 
Consequently, this case presents no occasion to consider whether a State may 
constitutionally apply a more relaxed standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of false statements injurious to a private individual under a false- 
light theory of invasion of privacy, or whether the constitutional standard an- 
nounced in Time, Inc. v. Hill applies to all false-light cases. 
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times engendered confusion, because instead of applying Hill's 
falsity test in the "discrete context" of false light privacy cases, 
courts have often applied it much more broadly. 
The New York Court of Appeals was struggling with another 
privacy case contemporaneously with the Supreme Court's delib- 
eration of Hill. Spahn v. Julian Messner, I ~ C . ~ ~  involved a rather 
liberally fictionalized, unauthorized biography of the well-known 
baseball star, Warren Spahn. He brought an action to enjoin 
publication and recover damages under the New York privacy 
statute. The New York court had two opportunities to set down 
its opinion of this case, since after the first disposition the Su- 
preme Court vacated the decision and remanded it for considera- 
tion in the light of Hill. There was in the two opinions some 
mixing of appropriation and false light privacy theory. 
In the first opinion the court outlined the reasons typically 
cited for acknowledging a right of publicity: 
The size of the audience attracted to each game, whether 
in person or by transmission, is the profession's [baseball's] 
bread and butter. The individual player's income will frequently 
be a direct reflection of his popularity and abiltiy to attract an 
audience. Professional privacy is thus the very antithesis of the 
player $ need and goal .86 
The court next summarized the purposes behind the New York 
privacy statute and emphasized one of its important excep- 
tions-that the law affords the public figure's privacy "little pro- 
t e c t i ~ n . " ~ ~  The court differentiated, however, the plaintiffs 
privacy interest and his right to be paid for and control the use 
of his personality: 
But it is erroneous to confuse privacy with "personality" or 
to assume that privacy, though lost for a certain time or in a 
certain context, goes forever unprotected . . . . Thus it may be 
Id. at  250-51. Subsequently, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), also 
a privacy case, Justice Powell in his concumng opinion noted: 
The Court's abandonment of the "matter of general or public interest" standard 
as the determinative factor for deciding whether to apply the New York Times 
malice standard to defamation litigation brought by private individuals, Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc. . . . calls into question the conceptual basis of Time, Inc. 
v. Hill. 
Id. a t  498 n.2. 
85. 18 N.Y.2d 324, 221 N.E.2d 543, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1966), vacated, 387 U.S. 239, 
on remand, 20 N.Y .2d 752,229 N.E.Fd 712,283 N.Y.S.2d 119, on reargument, 21 N.Y .2d 
124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969). 
86. Id. at 327, 221 N.E.2d at 544, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (emphasis added). 
87. Id. a t  328, 221 N.E.2d at  545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 879. 
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appropriate to say that plaintiff here, Warren Spahn, is a public 
personality and that, insofar as his professional career is in- 
volved, he is substantially without a right to privacy. That is not 
to say, however, that his "personality" may be fictionalized and 
that, as fictionalized, it may be exploited for the defendants' 
commercial benefit through the medium of an unauthorized bi- 
~ g r a p h y . ~ ~  
Holding that a "substantially fictitious" biography would not run 
afoul of first amendment  requirement^,^^ the court allowed recov- 
ery by the plaintiff. Arguably, then, the New York court was 
vindicating an interest similar to the right of publicity. Fatefully, 
however, the court mentioned that it did not believe the New 
York Times test had any application to the case.90 
The Supreme Court vacated the decision and ordered reargu- 
ment of the caseg1 in light of Hill. On remand, Spahn, which up 
to this point may well have been a right of publicity case, was 
treated as a false light privacy case, ignoring the previous right 
of publicity discussion. 
The court wrote: 
We 
for 
hold . . . that, before recovery by a public figure may be had 
an unauthorized presentation of his life, it must be shown 
. that the presentation is infected with material and sub- 
stantial falsification and that the work was published with 
knowledge of such falsification or with a reckless disregard for 
the 
The court held the evidence supported a finding of requisite fal- 
sity, and again awarded relief to the plaintiff.93 
The boundaries between the false light privacy tort and the 
right of publicity tort in cases such as Spahn are admittedly 
tricky. Is a fictionalized biography an appropriation of Spahn's 
interest in his name and personality (right of publicity), or is 
relief granted for the untruthful manner in which his life story is 
presented to the public (false light)? Resolution of this quandry 
is beyond the scope of this Comment, but acknowledgment of the 
difficulty avoids untempered criticism of the seeming confusion 
of the court in Spahn. Whatever the difficulties in the factual 
context of Spahn, however, New York courts floundered in cases 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 329, 221 N.E.2d at 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 880. 
90. Id. 
91. 387 U.S. 329 (1967). 
92. 21 N.Y.2d at 127, 233 N.E.2d at 842, 286 N.Y .S.2d at 834. 
93. Id. at 129, 233 N.E.2d at 843, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
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where distinctions between false light privacy and appropriation 
were not nearly so fine. 
In Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc. ,94 comedian Pat Paul- 
sen sought an injunction under the New York privacy statute 
against the defendant's distribution of a campaign poster during 
Paulsen's mock candidacy in the 1968 presidential race. The case 
was most definitely not a false light case. The defendant allegedly 
had appropriated a photograph of Paulsen and reproduced it with 
the words "For President" beneath it. The court wrote that the 
privacy statute was to protect a "person's right to be let alone," 
and was not enacted to afford relief for "various . . . species of 
property rights."95 Since the plaintiff was not seeking redress for 
"privacy," the privacy statute could not help him. Moreover, the 
court observed that even were the privacy statute applicable, the 
appropriation in the case would be privileged by the first amend- 
ment: 
[Wlhether the poster involved be considered as a significant 
satirical commentary upon the current presidential contest, or 
merely as a humorous presentation of a well-known entertainer's 
publicity gambit, or in any other light, be it social criticism or 
pure entertainment, it is sufficiently relevant to a matter of 
public interest to be a form of expression which is constitution- 
ally protected and "deserving of substantial freedom?"' 
The reasoning of the court is inexorable. Because of first 
amendment principles, the right of privacy cannot redress publi- 
cation of matters of public interest. If the appropriation here is 
styled as an invasion of privacy, it is therefore privileged by the 
first amendment. Thankfully, at least for credulity's sake, the 
court spared the discussion of possible results were the poster 
published with knowing "falsity" or reckless disregard of whether 
it was "true." 
Two years after Paulsen, a federal court in New York was 
confronted with another appropriation suit under the New York 
privacy statute. The plaintiff in Man v. Warner Brothers, Inc. 97 
sought damages for the defendant's unauthorized use of his 45- 
second performance of "Mess Call" on the flugelhorn during the 
renowned Woodstock rock festival. The segment, filmed by the 
defendants during the festival, had been inserted into the com- 
94. 59 Misc. 2d 444, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 1968). 
95. Id. at 450, 299 N.Y.S.2d at 608. 
96. Id. 
97. 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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pany's commercial film of the event. I t  would appear that a 
clearer case of commercial appropriation would indeed be diffi- 
cult to find. Yet the court denied relief. 
The court explained that the New York privacy statute was 
designed to protect persons from the unauthorized use of their 
pictures for purposes of trade! The court noted, however, that 
subsequent cases had engrafted exceptions onto the rule to avoid 
abridgment of the constitutional right of free speech: 
These cases establish that in light of the constitutional guaran- 
tee of free speech, Section 51 may not be applied to afford relief 
either to a public figure or in a matter of public interest in the 
absence of proof that the defendant published false material 
with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth. 
Time, Inc. v. Hill . . . . 99 
The plaintiff, unless he could show that the defendants knowingly 
appropriated a "false" performance, or used one in reckless disre- 
gard of its "truthfulness," was precluded from relief. 
In 1968, one noted scholar writing on the impact of the first 
amendment in the privacy area, noted that the appropriation 
branch of privacy would probably not raise any first amendment 
problems.loO The rationale was that "[tlhis right, sometimes 
called the right of publicity, involves the commercial appropria- 
tion of values which, whether or not labeled as 'property,' may 
not be freely plundered under the banner of the first amend- 
ment."lol But, nevertheless, the plunderers had waved the ban- 
ner-and had won. 
New York appellate courts were to redraw the line between 
first amendment privileges and appropriation three years later. 
In Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Systems, Inc. ,Io2 a corpo- 
ration formed by Howard Hughes to exploit his name and person- 
ality sued the defendants for their use of Hughes' name and bio- 
graphical data in its "The Howard Hughes Game." The defen- 
dants, predictably, placed heavy reliance on Paulsen. The 
Rosemont court dismissed this argument, stating that the 
"Paulsen case is unique to its facts and must be so considered."lo3 
98. Id. at 51. 
99. Id. at 51-52. 
100. Nimmer, supra note 75, at 957-58. 
101. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
102. 72 Misc. 2d 788, 340 N.Y.S.2d 144 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd as modified, 42 App. Div. 
2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1973) (injunction limited to state of New York). 
103. Id. at 790, 340 N.Y .S.2d at 146. 
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In contrast to the Paulsen court, the Rosernont court had little 
difficulty in extending protection of the New York privacy statute 
to appropriation of a celebrity's personality.lo4 
Then, after concluding that a celebrity's right of publicity 
was worthy of protection, the court asked the question in this area 
that, because left unasked, had caused confusion and absurd re- 
sults: "The question apparently is where does one draw the line 
between the right of the public to 'know' and an act of 
appropriation."lo5 The court, however, declined to draw any defi- 
nite line, preferring to leave the question to resolution by the 
courts on an ad hoc basis: 
As the Paulsen case, supra, would indicate this area of the law 
is plastic. Each case must be decided by weighing conflicting 
policies; the public interest in free dissemination of information, 
against the interest in the preservation of inviolate personality 
and property rights. Among the relevant factors in such deci- 
sions are the media used, the nature of the subject matter, and 
the extent of the actual invasion of privacy . . . . 106 
The ad hoc balance in the present case favored the plaintiff, the 
court held, as the defendants were really not disseminating news, 
but rather a game of chance.lo7 
New York, it appears, had finally battled its way through the 
sematic jungle of the privacy-appropriation-publicity cases to 
where the actual interests at stake in such cases could be identi- 
fied and, importantly, balanced against possibly competing first 
amendment interests. There had been a few casualties along the 
way,lo8 but even though the line between first amendment inter- 
ests and the right of publicity was not crystal clear, the general 
highway was safely marked out. 
The Supreme Court in Zacchini saved Ohio, and other 
states, similar difficulties. 
104. Id. : 
The instant action is quite clearly premised upon an appropriation for for com- 
mercial exploitation of plaintiffs property rights in his name and career rather 
than upon an injury to feelings. There is no question but that a celebrity has a 
legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. He must be considered 
as having invested years of practice and competition in a public personality 
which eventually may reach marketable status. That identity is a fruit of his 
labors and a type of property . . . . 
105. Id. (emphasis added). 
106. Id. at  790, 340 N.Y .S.2d at 147. 
107. Id. 
108. See, e.g., Man v. Warner Bros. Inc., 317 F. Supp. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Gautier 
v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 107 N.E.2d 485 (1952). 
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111. Zacchini IN STATE COURT: PRIVACY'S BRAMBLE BUSH 
After summary judgment for defendant in the trial court, 
Zacchini took his cause to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Ap- 
peals. That court held for him.loB 
The court's opinion began with Prosser's division of privacy 
into four branches, and noted that while the plaintiff claimed an 
invasion of his privacy, "we think none of Professor Prosser's 
categories provide a logically adequate embrace for the wrong the 
plaintiff claims has been done."l1° The court, noting that there 
was no privacy statute in Ohio, stated that common law privacy 
theory would not affect the case as Zacchini's claim "does not 
involve his privacy in any usual sense of the word."lll The court 
evidently had recognized the inherent differences between 
privacy and right of publicity: 
The performance which constitutes an "act" is the product 
of the actor's talent and is his property. And, if his act is appro- 
priately considered a dramatic or creative production, it in- 
volves a property right entitled to the same protection under the 
common law as any other property right . . . . 112 
The court wrote that while critical reviews or announcements of 
an act were to be distinguished, appropriation of an entire act on 
videotape was a consequence of "appalling perspective."l13 Then, 
the court groped for pigeonholes in which to categorize the tort. 
Stretching the concepts to the breaking point, it chose conver- 
sion114 and common law copyright .l15 
The court noted that in "ancient history" only tangibles 
could be converted,l16 but stated that the concept had been ex- 
panded to cover such symbols as promissory notes, checks, and 
stock certificates and that cases like Zacchini demanded a further 
extension. As for common law copyright, the court noted that this 
principle gives the creator of "intellectual productions" an inter- 
109. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. (Ohio Ct. 
App. July 10, 1975). 
110. Id. at A30. 
111. Id. at A32. 
112. Id. at A33. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at A34. 
115. Id. at A35. The Supreme Court, in the course of its opinion in Zacchini, analog- 
ized the right of publicity to patent and copyright laws. 97 S. Ct. at 2856-57. The state 
appellate court, however, went further than analogy-it claimed that common law copy- 
right law was directly applicable to the conflict before it. 
116. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., No. 33,713, slip op. at A34 (Ohio 
Ct. App. July 10, 1975). 
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est in his works until lost by general publication.l17 The court 
wrote that dramatic productions have been protected as literary 
property, and by "clear analogy the performance with which this 
case is concerned falls within the category of dramatic produc- 
tion."l18 As for the defendant's contention that public perform- 
ance a t  the fair constituted publication eliminating protection of 
common law copyright, the court wrote that such an issue "is one 
which must be resolved at  further proceedings in the trial 
court ."llB 
In response to the defendant's first amendment contentions, 
the court succinctly stated "the First Amendment provides no 
defense to the taking of private property against the owner's ex- 
plicit denial of permission."120 The court explained further that 
the first amendment was "not properly an issue here:"121 
There is no suggestion of a limitation on the defendant's right 
to comment. This case is not controlled by the reasons for re- 
versing the plaintiffs verdict in Time, Inc. v. Hill . . . . For 
that case involved a right to privacy to "redress false reports of 
matters of public interest" under the New York statute . . . . 
. . . The constitutional protection for free dissemination of 
ideas is neither threatened nor diminished by protecting the 
owner of property from its seizure under the guise of free expres- 
sion.lZ2 
A concurring opinion by Judge Manos added that the proper 
basis for recovery in the case was violation of the plaintiff's com- 
mon law right of pub1i~ity.l~~ 
The state supreme court disagreed with the intermediate 
court on the issues of conversion and common law copyright.lu 
The state high court noted that since the "distinguishing charac- 
teristic of conversion is the forced judicial sale of the chattel or 
right"125 wrongfully taken, extending conversion to the facts of the 
instant case where only "~ludicial ingenuity" could find a res 
to be sold would be "confusing, unnecessary, and improper."126 As 
117. Id. at A35. 
118. Id. a t  A37. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at A40. 
121. Id. at A39. 
122. Id. at A39-A40. 
123. Id. a t  A41 (Manos, J., concurring). 
124. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 226, 351 
N.E.2d 454, 456 (1976). 
125. Id. at 227, 351 N.E.2d at 457. 
126. Id. 
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for common law copyright, the state high court held the concept 
inapplicable to plaintiffs act as it was "not a literary or artistic 
expression, nor [was] it a dramatic composition, nor [was] it  
original."12' Logic that public performances would not constitute 
a publication terminating the right was dubbed "doubtful,"128 as 
such logic would grant a perpetual right against copying. The 
court concluded with its opinion "that plaintiffs claim is one for 
invasion of the right of privacy by appropriation, and should be 
considered as such."129 Unfortunately, the state supreme court, 
critical of the appellate court's handling of the conversion and 
copyright concepts, did not explore the substance of the lower 
court's reasoning-especially on the first amendment issue. The 
state appellate court perhaps botched the labels it applied to the 
substance of its holding; the state supreme court, however, 
botched the substance it placed behind its labels. 
The state supreme court, having resolved that it was adjudi- 
cating a privacy case, proceeded to delineate the elements of the 
appropriation branch of privacy. The court noted that jurisdic- 
tions with a privacy statute, such as New York, commonly require 
the appropriation to be for commercial uses, while common law 
jurisdictions probably do not require that the appropriation be 
used for purposes of trade:130 "The interest which the law protects 
is that of each individual to the exclusive use of his own identity, 
and that interest is entitled to protection from misuse whether 
the misuse is for commercial purposes or otherwise."131 The court 
then noted the distinction that had led the lower court to digress 
into conversion and common law copyright-what the plaintiff 
was seeking to protect was not his right to be "let alone," but his 
right to be paid for his performances: 
It is this right, a right of exclusive control over the publicity 
given to his performances, which the plaintiff seeks to protect. 
For a performer, this right is a valuable part of the benefit which 
may be attained by his talents and efforts, and we think that 
this right is entitled to legal protection, contrary to the holding 
of some earlier cases.132 
Thus, the court expressly adopted a common law right of public- 
ity. It had, in effect, reached the same conclusion as had the lower 
127. Id. at 228, 351 N.E.2d at 457. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 226, 351 N.E.2d at 456. 
130. Id. at 229, 351 N.E.2d at 458. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 232, 351 N.E.2d at 460. 
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court-the plaintiff had a valuable proprietary interest protected 
by law. But where the lower state court ascribed this right to 
conversion or copyright theory, the state supreme court adopted 
a new slot, the right of publicity. And somewhere above this slot 
was still hanging the label "privacy." While the lower court had 
avoided the confusion caused by the privacy-first amendment 
interface, the state supreme court was about to fall prey to some 
attractive, but shallow, reasoning. 
After establishing the right of publicity, the court next asked 
whether invasion of that right by the defendant was privileged by 
the first amendment. 133 The court answered affirmatively. The 
court began with the premise that the right of publicity fell under 
the right of privacy. Hill, according to the court, established a 
privilege "to report matters of legitimate public interest even 
though such reports might intrude on matters otherwise pri- 
~ a t e . " l ~ ~  It was "clear" to the court that a "public performance 
in a county fair is a matter of legitimate public interest?" There- 
fore, the defendant's use of the 15-second film clip of the plaintiff 
exploding from his cannon was privileged by the first amend- 
ment. The court stated: 
No fixed standard which would bar the press from reporting or 
depicting either an entire occurrence or an entire discrete part 
of a public performance can be formulated which would not 
unduly restrict the "breathing room" in reporting which free- 
dom of the press requires. The proper standard must necessarily 
be whether the matters reported were of public interest . . . . 136 
But what of Hill's restriction on its first amendment privilege 
that a publication cannot be made with knowing falsity or reck- 
less disregard for truth or falsity? To its credit, the Ohio court did 
not write into its opinion a limitation that broadcasters cannot 
show "knowingly false" videotapes of human cannonballs. 
Rather, the court stated that the broadcast privilege would be lost 
"only if its actual intent was not to report the performance, but, 
rather, to appropriate the performance for some other private use, 
or if the actual intent was to injure the performer."137 
Justice Celebrezze filed a dissenting opinion questioning the 
validity of the court's reliance on Hill in view of both the exten- 
133. Id. at 233, 351 N.E.2d at 460. 
134. Id. at 234, 351 N.E.2d at 461. 
135. Id. at 235, 351 N.E.2d at 461. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
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sive alterations of the Supreme Court's views on defamation since 
New York Times and the questionable present stand of the court 
on the issue presented in Hill.138 
The lockstep reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court has not 
been without supporters. A student comment on the court's deci- 
sion concluded that the proper result was reached.13g But the 
Supreme Court in Time, Inc. u. Firestone,140 another defamation 
case, warned against the hasty use of labels to reach legal results. 
The right of publicity may fit under the general broad heading 
of privacy, but that does not mean that the supposed first amend- 
ment privilege attached to false light privacy cases necessarily 
attaches to the right of publicity. "Whatever their general valid- 
ity, use of such [generalized] subject matter classifications to 
determine the extent of constitutional protection afforded . . . 
may too often result in an improper balance between the compet- 
ing interest . . . . "141 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH: BALANCING THE INTERESTS 
A. Settling the Confusion 
Zucchini gave the Court the opportunity to establish that 
Ohio's balance between free speech and proprietary interests in 
right of publicity cases is not mandated by the constitution. Fol- 
lowing its own caveat from Firestone, the Court carefully exam- 
ined the interests involved in the right of publicity before balanc- 
ing that right against the first amendment. 
First, the Court noted that the interests involved in the false 
light and right of publicity torts are different. The interest pro- 
tected in false light cases is "clearly that of reputation, with the 
same overtones of mental distress as in defamation. By contrast, 
the State's interest in permitting a 'right of publicity' is in pro- 
tecting the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part 
138. Id: at 236-40, 351 N.E.2d at 462-65 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting); see also note 84 
supra. 
139. Comment, Tort Law: Appropriation of a Performer's Act By the News Media-Is 
It Privileged?, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 786 (1977). The Comment concludes: 
By articulating the "right of publicity" under which a public figure may control 
the commercial use of his name and likeness, the Ohio court lends new impetus 
to the growing body of legal writers who have acknowledged this branch of the 
"right of privacy." The court's recognition of the limitations placed on the rights 
of privacy and publicity by the factual reporting of matters of legitimate public 
interest adheres to an accepted principle of American law. 
Id. at 791 (footnotes omitted). 
140. 424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
141. Id. at 456. 
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to encourage such entertainment? The Court likened this lat- 
ter goal to those of patent and copyright laws that assure the 
individual the fruits of his labors and have "little to do with 
protecting feelings or reputation."ld3 Additionally, the two torts 
differ in the "degree to which they intrude on dissemination of 
information to the public."ld4 In false light cases, a plaintiff is 
eager to minimize publication. In right of publicity cases, how- 
ever, instead of arguing for limiting publication the plaintiff is 
merely litigating the question of "who gets to do the publish- 
ing."ld5 The Court, therefore, held that Hill was inapplicable.ld6 
Other defamation cases with arguable impact on the case were 
also summarily dismissed: 
These cases, like New York Times, emphasize the protection 
extended to the press by the First Amendment in defamation 
cases, particularly when suit is brought by a public official or a 
public figure. None of them involve an alleged appropriation by 
the press of a right of publicity existing under state law.147 
The Court, of course, did not discuss the propriety or necessity 
of establishing a common law right of publicity, but did give its 
answer to the question posed by the New York court in Rosernont: 
"[Wlhere does one draw the line between the right of the public 
to know and an act of appr~pria t ion?"~~~ 
Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn be- 
tween media reports that are protected and those that are not, 
we are quite sure that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do 
not immunize the media when they broadcast a performer's 
entire act without his ~ 0 n s e n t . l ~ ~  
On remand, Ohio may privilege the press in the circumstances of 
Zacchini, but the "First and Fourteenth Amendments do not 
require it to do so."150 
Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, 
142. 97 S .  Ct. at 2856 (quoting Prosser, supra note 1, at 400) (footnote omitted). 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2855-56. 
147. Id. at 2856 (emphasis added). The cases cited by the Court were Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); and 
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971). 
148. Rosemont Enterprises, Inc. v. Urban Syss., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 788, 790, 340 
N.Y.S.2d 144, 146 (Sup. Ct. 1973); see notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra. 
149. 97 S. Ct. at 2856-57 (emphasis added). 
150. Id. at 2858. 
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dissented. He argued that first amendment privileges should not 
be based upon appropriation of an "entire act," but on the use a 
television station makes of the act: "I would hold that the First 
Amendment protects the station from a 'right of publicity' or 
'appropriation' suit, absent a strong showing by the plaintiff that 
the news broadcast was a subterfuge or cover for private or com- 
mercial exploitation."151 Justice Stevens also dissented, arguing 
that Ohio's grounds for decision were so unclear as to warrant 
remand for clarification rather than for the Court to assume that 
the decision was based on first amendment and not independent 
state grounds. 152 
B. Validity of the Court's Result 
With a relatively brief opinion,ls3 the Supreme Court man- 
aged in Zucchini to untangle several major confusions in privacy 
law. The performer's interest in his act or personality protected 
under the heading of the right of publicity was clearly analogized 
to copyright and patent law.15* So classified, the right runs little 
risk of being "waived" when a celebrity loses his "privacy" or of 
encountering the other difficulties outlined earlier in this Com- 
ment.l" Most importantly, the right of publicity branch of pri- 
vacy law was firmly distinguished from a false light privacy tort 
and its concomitant first amendment privilege. While the Court 
left the right of publicity under the general privacy rubric,lS6 pos- 
sibility of confusion between false light and appropriation torts 
in the future should be remote-a false light case involves "an 
entirely different tort than the 'right of publicity' . . . . v 157 
The balance struck by the Court between first amendment 
concerns and the right of publicity was the result of careful weigh- 
ing of competing proprietary and free speech interests. Inasmuch 
as the Court analogized the interests involved to patent and copy- 
right laws,158 an analysis of competing copyright and first amend- 
151. Id. at 2860 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
152. Id. at 2860-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
153. The opinion, as printed in the Supreme Court Reporter, is only 12 pages long. 
Id. at 2849 (1977). 
154. Id. at 2856-57. 
155. See notes 47-55 and accompanying text supra. 
156. 97 S. Ct. at 2855. 
157. Id. Completely severing the right of publicity from the privacy rubric would 
substantially alleviate any remaining confusion in this area. As the right of publicity does 
not involve the right to be "let alone," it unnecessarily complicates privacy law by its 
inclusion. See notes 59-69 and accompanying text supra. 
158. Id. at 2856-57. 
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ment interests will be useful in evaluating the balance struck by 
the Court between the right of publicity and free speech in 
Zacchini. 
Free speech interests in the copyright area are perhaps most 
succintly summarized in the copyright clause of the Constitution: 
"To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing 
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective Writings and Disco~eries."~~~ These interests, 
as has been noted by Professor Nimmer,lW may clash with the 
interests protected by the first amendment. Some of these possi- 
bly conflicting first amendment interests were summarized by 
Justice Brandeis in his classic concurrence in Whitney v. 
California.161 According to Brandeis, free speech is: first, a neces- 
sary component of a self-governing or democratic society- 
democracy cannot long survive without informed electors; 
second, an end in itself-man realizes self-fulfillment only if free 
to express himself; and finally, a safety valve-it is hazardous to 
discourage thought as men are less prone to violence if they can 
express themselves nonvi01ently.l~~ The balance struck in the co- 
pyright area between these competing interests is that copyright 
laws protect expression, while the first amendment privileges 
ideasY3 Thus, according to Professor Nimmer, both copyright 
and free speech interests are optimally served.164 Unshackling the 
use of ideas does not hurt creators, as it is often necessary for 
them to borrow liberally from each other anyway. Protecting ex- 
pression-i. e . ,  the form in which, for example, a book is set down 
by an author-protects the author's proprietary interest in his 
labor, but does not prohibit free discussion of the ideas contained 
in the b00k.l~~ Moreover, Brandeis' three free speech interests are 
vindicated. As ideas are not protected by copyright law, they can 
be freely disseminated among a well-informed electorate. Self- 
expression, the second Brandeis category, is not harmed as it 
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, 4 8, c1. 8. 
160. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees of Free 
Speech and Press?, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970). 
161. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
162. Id. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
163. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546,571 (1973) (record piracy statute valid 
as it does not restrict use of ideas); Robert Stigwood Group, Ltd. v. OYReilly, 346 F. Supp. 
376 (D. Conn. 1972) (unauthorized use of substantially the entire rock opera "Jesus Christ 
Superstar" not privileged by first amendment); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 345 F. 
Supp. 108 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (unauthorized use of Disney cartoon characters not privileged 
by first amendment). 
164. Nimmer, supra note 160, at 1202. 
165. Id. 
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would not be served by allowing wholesale plagiarism- 
plagiarism cannot be said to be "self-expression" in the first 
place. Finally, men will not be prone to riot because they cannot 
copy and claim as their own the work of another.lB6 
The Supreme Court in Zacchini struck a similar balance 
between the first amendment and the right of publicity when it 
declared that appropriation of an "entire act" was not constitu- 
tionally privileged. Thus, while the "idea" of a human cannon- 
ball's act is not protected, Zacchini's actual performance is. Any- 
one with the requisite daring (or foolhardiness) can learn the 
skills of a human cannonball, and Zacchini could not complain.lB7 
The television station could express the "idea" that a human 
cannonball was performing at the fair, and again Zacchini would 
have no complaint. As the Court wrote, "It is evident, and there 
is no claim to the contrary, that petitioner's state-law right of 
publicity would not serve to prevent respondent from reporting 
the newsworthy facts about petitioner's act."lB8 Filming and tele- 
vising Zacchini's stunt, however, was more than appropriation of 
a mere "idea;" it was, to adapt language from Professor Nimmer, 
appropriating "the particular selection and arrangement of ideas, 
as well as . . . specificity in the form of their expression which 
warrants protection under the [right of publicity]."16Q 
The balance struck by the court between free speech and 
right of publicity interests appears to be valid and reasonable. 
Democratic dialogue will not appreciably suffer because viewers 
of the late evening news will be limited to a photograph and 
verbal description of the human cannonball's thrilling act instead 
of a videotape of the entire event. The essential free speech con- 
tent of the event will have been broadcast, and Mr. Zacchini's 
proprietary interest in his act will have been protected. (How 
many of the viewers would bother to travel to the fair and perhaps 
pay an admission fee to see something they had observed on color 
television the night before?) A television station seeking self- 
fulfillment perhaps would prefer to broadcast its station manager 
being shot out of a cannon rather than Zacchini, and it is doubtful 
that being told about rather than seeing a human cannonball will 
166. Id. at 1191-93. 
167. The Court stated in a footnote, "Of course this case does not involve a claim 
that respondents would be prevented by petitioner's 'right of publicity' from staging or 
filming its own 'human cannonball' act." 97 S. Ct. at 2858 n.13. 
168. Id. at 2856. 
169. Nimmer, supra note 160, at 1190. 
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provoke many television viewers to vi01ence.l~~ And besides pro- 
tecting Zacchini's interest in his act, prohibiting a broadcast of 
the event could have long-term benefits for the public-"the pro- 
tection provides an economic incentive for him to make the in- 
vestment required to produce a performance of interest to the 
public. " 171 
Obviously, the "entire act" test is uniquely adapted to the 
context of television news reports of performers' acts. The test 
does not translate easily into other right of publicity cases involv- 
ing differing factual settings-such as appropriation of a celeb- 
rity's picture as in Paulsen or appropriation of a celebrity's inter- 
est in his life story as in Rosemont. But, nevertheless, the holding 
in Zacchini will be a significant roadmark in these cases as well. 
Zacchini firmly establishes that the right of publicity protects 
rights analogous to copyright and patent interests. Just as the 
Supreme Court examined those interests in the specific context 
of the Zacchini facts, other courts faced with factually dissimilar 
right of publicity cases can look to the general area of copyright 
and first amendment law for guidance. For example, the doctrine 
of "fair use" in the copyright area, especially as outlined in the 
new federal copyright statute,lT2 should provide a touchstone for 
resolution of cases similar to Rosemont and Paulsen. 
170. Indeed, it is questionable whether viewing the human cannonball act would have 
any impact on the television audience. The mere spectacle of a man being blown from a 
cannon is probably pale when compared to the videoaction crammed into one hour of the 
life of, for example, a television supercop. 
171. 97 S. Ct. a t  2857. 
172. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (to be codified at  17 
U.S.C.). The new copyright statute, effective Jan. 1, 1978, explicitly outlines the criteria 
to be used in determining whether use of copyright material is privileged as a "fair use:" 
[Tlhe fair use of copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as criticism, com- 
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), 
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors 
to be considered shall include- 
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market nor or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
Id. 5 107. 
It is possible that the Supreme Court reached its decision in Zucchini after weighing 
the factors involved in the case in a manner similar to that outlined in the above statute. 
While the use was for news or arguably "educational" purposes, substantially all of the 
human cannonball's act was appropriated; the Court expressed concern over the possible 
ill effects this appropriation could have on the future value of the act. 97 S. Ct. a t  2857. 
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C. Media Impact, Damages, and Consent 
The balance struck by the Court between first amendment 
and right of publicity interests in the area of media news reports 
is certain to be unpopular in some quarters. Broadcasters, for 
example, would almost assuredly prefer the approach taken by 
the dissent, which would have privileged all uses of film footage 
on news programs absent a showing of use for commercial exploi- 
tation.lT3 But the effect of Zucchini on television news will proba- 
bly not be great in any event. There are few "entire acts" short 
enough to be broadcast in news programs; most such programs 
use short film clips or videotape cuts lasting less than a few min- 
utes. Thus, the "chilling" effect on the media decried by the 
dissentlT4 will probably be minimal. The Court in Zucchini em- 
ployed what scholars have termed "definitional balancing"lT5 in 
announcing its result. Instead of leaving to trial courts the duty 
to ascertain and balance on an ad hoc level the competing free 
speech and proprietary interests in each right of publicity case 
involving appropriation of an act (as, for example, the New York 
court in Rosemont did), the courts and the media have been left 
a rule-appropriation of "entire acts" is not privileged by the first 
amendment. Although the "entire act" test may not be the 
Court's final word on the subjectlT6 and the term is burdened with 
the usual semantic uncertainties of all new legal tests, it will be 
rare that a television news editor will not be able to resolve most 
doubts about liability by editing the clip so as to emphasize the 
173. Id. at  2860 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
174. Id. at  2859-60. 
175. Nimmer, supra note 75, at  942. The term "definitional balancing" was coined 
to differentiate this practice from "ad hoc balancing." With ad hoc balancing, the trial 
court discerns the conflicting free speech and proprietary interests a t  stake in each case 
and makes a judgment as to which, in the discrete context of the case, is weightier and 
deserves to prevail. While ad hoc balancing appears to present the opportunity for perhaps 
a more just resolution of a given case, it has one major drawback-the process leaves no 
rule for the public and the courts to rely on. And often, absence of a rule tends to "chill" 
exercise of first amendment rights. Not knowing what speech is protected, only the coura- 
geous speak. Id. a t  939-42. The definitional approach has the major advantage of leaving 
a rule behind which can guide the outcome of future cases. "[Tlhe court employs balanc- 
ing not for the purpose of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular 
case, but only for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as 
'speech' within the meaning of the first amendment." Id. a t  942. 
176. The Court wrote, "Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn 
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast 
a performer's entire act without his consent." 97 S. Ct. a t  2856-57 (emphasis added). This 
holding, obviously, leaves open the possibility that something less than an "entire act" 
may be protected by the right of publicity without any first amendment difficulty. 
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"newsworthy facts" of an act rather than show it in its entirety.17' 
Moreover, in states such as New York with a privacy statute, 
the impact of Zacchini upon the media may well be nil. Ohio, a 
common law privacy jurisdiction, does not require that the appro- 
priation be for advertising purposes or for uses of trade. Privacy 
statutes uniformly require such a use.178 Prosser's text on torts, 
cited by the Supreme Court,17' states that while newspapers are 
published for a profit, not everything printed in the newspaper 
meets the statutory definition of "for trade purposes."180 There- 
fore, in statutory privacy jurisdictions, a television news program 
using film clips even of "entire acts" may escape liability if such 
use is not "for trade purposes." 
If found liable, the media will obviously be concerned about 
possible damage awards in right of publicity suits. The majority 
opinion in Zacchini states that one of the major rationales for the 
right of publicity is to prevent unjust enrichment: "No social 
purpose is served by having the defendant get for free some aspect 
of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he 
would normally pay."lgl Thus, it appears that the measure of 
damages in these appropriation cases could be the profit the de- 
fendant realizes by his wrongful appropriation. In a footnote, 
however, the Court talks as though the measure of damages 
would be the injury to the plaintiffs income caused by decreased 
public interest in seeing the act live after viewing it on televi- 
~ i 0 n . l ~ ~  Inasmuch as the Court analogized the right of publicity 
to copyright law, presumably recovery of damages would be simi- 
lar to recovery of damages under copyright law. Under common 
law copyright damages rules, a plaintiff may recover the change 
in market value of his proprietary interest or, alternatively, the 
profits derived by the defendant from the infringement.'" Since 
the common law allows both measures of recovery, ambivalence 
177. Id9 
178. Typical is the New York statute, which requires that the use be for "the purpose 
of advertising" or "for trade purposes." N.Y. Cw. RGHTS LAW $ 6  50-51 (McKinney 1976). 
See note 30 and accompanying text supra. 
179. 97 S. Ct. a t  2856-57 n.11. 
180. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 806-07 (4th ed. 1971). 
181. 97 S. Ct. a t  2857 (citing Kalven, supra note 27, a t  331). 
182. Id. n.12: "It is possible, of course, that respondent's news broadcast increased 
the value of petitioner's performance by stimulating the public's interest in seeing the act 
live. In these circumstances, petitioner would not be able to prove damages and thus 
would not recover." 
The dissent, with some disapproval, noted this seeming ambivalence on damages. Id. 
at  2859 n .2 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
183. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT $ 150 (1963). 
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on the damage question in the majority's opinion is likely not a 
product of court oversight. 
Damages, it should be further noted, will be a difficult part 
of the plaintiffs case. Proving decreased income as a direct result 
of a television broadcast-or unjust enrichment of the broad- 
caster-may be impossible in some cases. Thus, the damage ele- 
ment of right of publicity cases alone may be sufficient to shield 
the media from any barrage of unfounded Zucchini-type lawsuits. 
Another possible escape for the media lies in the consent 
requirement of the Zacchini holding. If use of the "entire act" is 
with the performer's consent, no liability arises.lg4 The factual 
circumstances of Zacchini were rather unusual, in that plaintiff 
expressly objected to the filming and broadcasting, yet that 
objection was disregarded.ls5 Most performers will be aware of the 
presence of news cameras during their acts because of the neces- 
sary lights and often bulky equipment. There are several old cases 
holding that consent, if not express, will at least be implied from 
long acquiescence with knowledge of infringement.18' Presence of 
a television news camera a t  his act should certainly inform a 
performer that his interest in his act is about to be "infringed." 
He must also realize that in these days of electronic journalism 
he cannot "acquiesce" for longer than a few hours or any film of 
his act will have been broadcast. Thus, it may be reasonable to 
argue that the performer impliedly consents if he allows the film- 
ing and does not object before broadcasting.18' This implication, 
however, places a heavy burden on the performer and is a rather 
extreme extension of the older consent cases-in those instances 
plaintiffs had been aware of the infringing use for a period of some 
years. 
The right of privacy, envisioned by Warren and Brandeis as 
- 
184. 97 S. Ct. a t  2856-57. 
185. Id. a t  2851. 
186. Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 F.2d 920 (3d Cir.),' cert. 
denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1941); H.M. Chandler Co. v. Penn Paper Prods., 88 F. Supp. 753 
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). 
187. This implication, of course, could not be made where live cameras were used to 
broadcast the act simulaneously with its performance and the performer had no form of 
advance warning. 
188. For example, the plaintiff in Edwin L. Wiegand Co. v. Harold E. Trent Co., 122 
F.2d 920 (3d Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 667 (1942), waited over three years to bring 
suit after he first knew of the defendant's infringement. 
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the right to be "let alone,"18B has grown to encompass various 
interests-often having little in common. Recently, courts have 
recognized that the proprietary interests protected by the right of 
publicity are separate and distinct from those of other privacy 
torts-specifically invasions of privacy through placing a person 
in a false light. But in spite of these basic differences, constitu- 
tional free speech provisions applicable to false light cases have 
sometimes been applied across the board to all privacy cases, 
including appropriation and right of publicity cases, with little 
thought as to the underlying issues involved. 
The Supreme Court in Zacchini was faced with an instance 
of just such reasoning. The Ohio Supreme Court had reasoned 
that the right of publicity is a branch of privacy theory, that 
matters otherwise protected by privacy theory are privileged by 
the first amendment if they are of public interest, and that there- 
fore an appropriation is privileged if the matter appropriated is 
of public interest. Though states may reach such a result on the 
basis of state law, the Supreme Court held that the first amend- 
ment does not mandate such a result. The underlying interests 
protected by the false light privacy tort and the right of publicity 
tort are diverse and demand different first amendment analyses. 
While the false light tort is concerned with reputation, the public- 
ity tort protects a person's valuable interest in his name and 
personality. Tension between the first amendment and the pub- 
licity tort resembles that between the first amendment and the 
copyright laws. Just as copyright laws protect the discrete expres- 
sion of literary property while the first amendment defends the 
free exchange of ideas, so the right of publicity protects the ex- 
pression of a performer's act while the first amendment privileges 
the "idea" of the act. It is now settled that the first amendment 
does not protect appropriation of a performer's entire act. Further 
analogies from copyright and first amendment law will be useful 
in other factual settings involving the right of publicity. 
While the resolution of the competing interests in Zacchini 
is not expected to be popular with the media, it appears to pro- 
vide a proper balance of the rights involved. Though the public 
should be informed of the performance of a human cannonball at 
the fair if a television station elects to broadcast such informa- 
tion, the television station has no right to obtain and exploit an 
interest in the performance for which others would normally have 
to pay. This assures the performer the fruits of his labor and may 
189. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 21, at 195. 
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in the end benefit the public, as the performer will have the 
incentive to continually produce an act interesting to the public. 
When Hugo Zacchini was fired from his cannon that day in 
August 1972, he probably had no intention to make legal his- 
tory-he undoubtedly only wanted to make his net 200 feet away. 
And when he brought his suit for appropriation of professional 
property, he probably had no intention to clarify the first amend- 
ment's role in right of publicity cases-he wanted his money. 
As of June 1977 he has achieved all these things-except, as 
far as can be ascertained, his goal of money.lgO 
190. The case was reversed. 97 S. Ct. at 2859. Negotiations between counsel or further 
judicial proceedings will be necessary before the human cannonball reaches his target of 
hard cash. 
